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Abstract. In wireless data networks, communication is particularly sus-
ceptible to eavesdropping due to its broadcast nature. Security and pri-
vacy systems have become critical for wireless providers and enterprise
networks. This paper considers the problem of secret communication
over the Gaussian broadcast channel, where a multi-antenna transmit-
ter sends independent confidential messages to two users with perfect
secrecy. That is, each user would like to obtain its own message reliably
and confidentially. First, a computable Sato-type outer bound on the
secrecy capacity region is provided for a multi-antenna broadcast chan-
nel with confidential messages. Next, a dirty-paper secure coding scheme
and its simplified version are described. For each case, the corresponding
achievable rate region is derived under the perfect secrecy requirement.
Finally, two numerical examples demonstrate that the Sato-type outer
bound is consistent with the boundary of the simplified dirty-paper cod-
ing secrecy rate region.
Key words: secure communication, broadcast channels, multiple an-
tennas
1 Introduction
The need for efficient, reliable, and secure data communication over wireless net-
works has been rising rapidly for decades. Due to its broadcast nature, wireless
communication is particularly susceptible to eavesdropping. The inherent prob-
lematic nature of wireless networks exposes not only the risks and vulnerabilities
that a malicious user can exploit and severely compromise the network but also
multiplies information confidentiality concerns with respect to in-network ter-
minals. Hence, security and privacy systems have become critical for wireless
providers and enterprise networks.
In this work, we consider multiple antenna secure broadcast in wireless net-
works. This research is inspired by the seminal paper [1], in which Wyner intro-
duced the so-called wiretap channel and proposed an information theoretic ap-
proach to secure communication schemes. Under the assumption that the channel
⋆ This research was supported by the National Science Foundation under Grants ANI-
03-38807 and CNS-06-25637.
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Fig. 1. Multiple-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential message
to the eavesdropper is a degraded version of that to the desired receiver, Wyner
characterized the capacity-secrecy tradeoff for the discrete memoryless wiretap
channel and showed that secure communication is possible without sharing a se-
cret key. Later, the result was extended by Csisza´r and Ko¨rner who determined
the secrecy capacity for the non-degraded broadcast channel (BC) with a single
confidential message set intended for one of the users [2].
In more general wireless network scenarios, secure communication may in-
volve multiple users and multiple antennas. Motivated by wireless communica-
tions, where transmitted signals are broadcast and can be received by all users
within the communication range, a significant research effort has been invested
in the study of the information-theoretic limits of secure communication in dif-
ferent wireless network environments [3–10].
This issues motivate us to study the multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast chan-
nel with confidential messages (MGBC-CM), in which independent confidential
messages from a multi-antenna transmitter are to be communicated to two users.
The corresponding broadcast communication model is shown in Fig. 1. Each user
would like to obtain its own message reliably and confidentially.
To give insight into this problem, we first consider a single antenna Gaussian
broadcast channel (GBC). Note that this channel is degraded [11], which means
that if a message can be successfully decoded by the inferior user, then the
superior user is also ensured of decoding it. Hence, the secrecy rate of the inferior
user is zero and this problem is reduced to the scalar Gaussian wiretap channel
problem [12] whose secrecy capacity is now the maximum rate achievable by the
superior user. This analysis gives rise to the question: can the transmitter, in fact,
communicate with both users confidentially at nonzero rate under some other
conditions? Roughly speaking, the answer is in the affirmative. In particular, the
transmitter can communicate when equipped with sufficiently separated multiple
antennas.
We here have two goals motivated directly by questions arising in practice.
The first is to determine the condition under which both users can obtain their
own messages reliably and confidentially. This is equivalent to evaluating the se-
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crecy capacity region for the MGBC-CM. The second is to show how the trans-
mitter should broadcast securely, which is equivalent to designing an achievable
secure coding scheme. To this end, a computable Sato-type outer bound on the
secrecy capacity region is developed for the MGBC-CM in Sec. 3. Next, a dirty-
paper secure coding scheme and its simplified version are described. For each
case, the corresponding achievable rate region is derived under perfect secrecy
requirement in Sec. 4. Finally, two numerical examples demonstrate that the
Sato-type outer bound is consistent with the boundary of the simplified dirty-
paper coding (DPC) secrecy rate region in Sec. 5.
2 System Model
We consider the communication of confidential messages to two users over a
Gaussian broadcast channel via t transmit-antennas. Each user is equipped with
a single receive-antenna. The received signals at user 1 and user 2 are are modeled
as
y1,i = h
Hxi + z1,i
y2,i = g
Hxi + z2,i, i = 1, . . . , n (1)
where xi ∈ Ct is the transmitted vector at time i, z1,i and z2,i correspond to two
independent, zero-mean, unit-variance, complex Gaussian noise sequences, and
h, g ∈ Ct are channel attenuation vectors corresponding to user 1 and user 2,
respectively. The channel input is constrained by
1
n
n∑
i=1
|xi|2 ≤ A (2)
where A is the total transmit energy per channel use. We also assume that both
the transmitter and receivers are aware of the attenuation vectors h and g.
As shown in Fig. 1, the transmitter intends to send an independent confi-
dential message Wk ∈ {1, . . . ,Mk} , Wk to the respective user k ∈ {1, 2} in n
channel uses. To increase the randomness of transmitted messages, we consider a
stochastic encoder at the transmitter. More explicitly, the encoder is specified by
a matrix of conditional probability density f(xn|w1, w2), where xn = [x1, . . . ,xn]
and wk ∈ Wk. In other words, f(xn|w1, w2) is the probability density associated
with the conditional probability that the messages (w1, w2) are encoded as the
channel input xn.
The decoding function at user k is a mapping φk : C
n → Wk. The se-
crecy levels with respect to the confidential messages W1 and W2 are measured,
respectively, at receivers 1 and 2 with respect to the normalized equivocations
1
n
H(W2|Y n1 ,W1) and
1
n
H(W1|Y n2 ,W2). (3)
An (M1,M2, n, Pe) code for the broadcast channel consists of the encoding
function f , decoding functions φ1, φ2, and the maximum error probability Pe ,
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max{Pe,1, Pe,2}, where Pe,k is the error probability for user k given by
Pe,k = P
[
φk(Y
n
k ) 6= wk
]
. (4)
A rate pair (R1, R2) is said to be achievable for the broadcast channel with
confidential messages if, for any ǫ > 0, there exists an (M1,M2, n, Pe) code that
satisfies Pe ≤ ǫ, Mk ≥ 2nRk , for k = 1, 2, and the perfect secrecy requirement
H(W1)−H(W1|Y n2 ,W2) ≤ nǫ and H(W2)−H(W2|Y n1 ,W1) ≤ nǫ. (5)
The secrecy capacity region of CBCC of the MGBC-CM is the closure of the
set of all achievable rate pairs (R1, R2).
3 Outer Bound on the Secrecy Capacity Region
3.1 Sato-Type Outer Bound
We first consider a Sato-type bound that can be applied to both discrete mem-
oryless and Gaussian broadcast channels with confidential messages (BC-CM).
Let P be the set of channels PeY1,eY2|X that have the same marginal distributions
as PY1,Y2|X, i.e.,
PeY1|X(y1|x) = P (y1|x) and PeY2|X(y2|x) = P (y2|x) (6)
for all y1, y2 and x. Let RO
(
PeY1,eY2|X, PX
)
denote the union of all rate pairs
(R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ I(X; Y˜1|Y˜2) and R2 ≤ I(X; Y˜2|Y˜1) (7)
for given distributions PX and PeY1,eY2|X.
Theorem 1. The secrecy capacity region CBCC of the BC-CM satisfies
CBCC ⊆
⋂
P eY1, eY2|X
∈P
{⋃
PX
RO
(
PeY1,eY2|X, PX
)}
. (8)
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 1. The outer bound (8) follows by letting the users decode the message
in a cooperative manner, while evaluating the secrecy level in an individual man-
ner. Hence, the eavesdropped signal is always a degraded version of the entire
received signal. This permits the use of the wiretap channel result of [1].
Remark 2. Although Theorem 1 is based on a degraded argument, the outer
bound (8) can be applied to general broadcast channels with confidential mes-
sages.
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3.2 Sato-Type Outer Bound for the Gaussian BC-CM
For the Gaussian channel case, we can simplify the outer bound (8) using the
following steps. First, the channel family P is the set of channels (1) where z1
and z2 are replaced by arbitrarily correlated, zero-mean, unit-variance, Gaussian
random variables z˜1 and z˜2 with covariance ν. Furthermore, we consider a new
coordinate transform as the setting of [10] and rewrite the broadcast channel
model (1) as follows:
y1 = |h|s1 + z˜1
y2 = α|g|s1 +
√
1− |α|2|g|s2 + z˜2. (9)
where
α =
gHh
|h||g| , s1 =
hHx
|h| and s2 =
(|h|g − α|g|h)Hx√
1− |α|2|h||g| . (10)
From now on, we define
s =
[
s1
s2
]
, h˜ = |h|[1, 0]H and g˜ = |g|[α, √1− |α|2]H . (11)
The vector s can be interpreted as the projection of x onto the subspace spanned
by h and g, or more precisely, the projection of x onto the 2 orthonormal bases
r1 =
h
|h| and r2 =
|h|g − α|g|h√
1− |α|2|h||g| . (12)
Since the projection operation cannot increase the length of a vector, the covari-
ance matrix KS1,S2 satisfies the input constraint tr(KS1,S2) ≤ A. We also note
that the Markov chain property X→ (S1, S2)→ (Y˜1, Y˜2) holds, and hence,
I(X; Y˜1|Y˜2) = I(S1, S2; Y˜1|Y˜2) and I(X; Y˜2|Y˜1) = I(S1, S2; Y˜2|Y˜1). (13)
Following [12], it can be shown that Gaussian input distributions maximize RO
by applying the maximum-entropy theorem [11]. Hence, we restrict attention to
a zero-mean Gaussian pair (S1, S2) with the covariance matrix KS1,S2 . These
facts are summarized in the following.
For a multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel, the rate region RO is a
function of the noise covariance ν and the input covariance matrix KS1,S2 , i.e.,
RO(ν, KS1, S2) is the union of all rate pairs (R1, R2) satisfying
R1 ≤ log2
KeY1,eY2
(1 − |ν|2)(1 + g˜HKS1,S2 g˜)
(14)
and
R2 ≤ log2
KeY1,eY2
(1 − |ν|2)(1 + h˜HKS1,S2h˜)
(15)
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where KeY1,eY2 is the covariance matrix of Y˜1 and Y˜2. This covariance matrix is
given explicitly by
KeY1,eY2 =
√
1− |α|2|h˜|2|g˜|2|KS1,S2 |+ h˜HKS1,S2h˜+ g˜HKS1,S2 g˜
− g˜HKS1,S2(νh˜)− (νh˜)HKS1,S2 g˜ + 1− |ν|2. (16)
Theorem 2. For an MGBC-CM, the secrecy capacity region CBCC satisfies
CBCC ⊆
⋂
0≤|ν|≤1
 ⋃
KS1,S2∈A
RO(ν, KS1,S2)
 (17)
where A is the set of all covariance matrices satisfying the input constraint
tr(KS1,S2) ≤ A.
Proof. Theorem 2 follows from Theorem 1 and the fact that the optimum input
distribute is Gaussian.
Remark 3. Theorem 2 describes a computable outer bound of the secrecy ca-
pacity region for the MGBC-CM. The bound (17) provides a benchmark for
evaluating the goodness of achievable coding schemes described in next section.
4 Inner Bound and Achievable Coding Scheme
4.1 Inner Bound for the BC-CM
An inner bound for the BC-CM has been established in [13, Theorem 3]. Here
we first review the result as follows. Let V1 and V2 be auxiliary random vari-
ables. We define Ω as the class of joint probability densities p(v1, v2,x, y1, y2)
that factor as p(v1, v2)p(x|v1, v2)p(y1, y2|x). Let RI(π) denote the union of all
(R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ I(V1;Y1)− I(V1;Y2|V2)− I(V1;V2) (18)
and
0 ≤ R2 ≤ I(V2;Y2)− I(V2;Y1|V1)− I(V1;V2) (19)
for a given joint probability density π ∈ Ω.
Theorem 3. [13, Theorem 3] Any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ co
{⋃
π∈Ω
RI(π)
}
(20)
is achievable for the broadcast channel with confidential messages, where co{S}
denotes the convex hull of the set S.
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The proof of Theorem 3 can be found in [13]. Here, we provide an alternative
view on this result. The best known achievable rate for a general BC was found
by Marton in [14]. For a given joint density p(v1, v2,x), the Marton sum rate
(without a common rate) is given by
I(V1;Y1) + I(V2;Y2)− I(V1;V2).
On the other hand, the total (both intended and eavesdropped) information rate
obtained by user 2 is bounded by I(V1, V2;Y2). This implies that to satisfy the
perfect secrecy requirement, the achievable secrecy rate of user 1 can be written
as
R1 ≤ [I(V1;Y1) + I(V2;Y2)− I(V1;V2)]− I(V1, V2;Y2)
which leads to the bound in (18).
Remark 4. We note that for a broadcast channel, we can employ joint encoding
at the transmitter. However, to preserve confidentiality, both achievable rates in
(18) and (19) include a penalty term I(V1;V2). Hence, compared with Marton’s
sum rate bound [14], here, we pay “double” to jointly encode at the transmitter.
4.2 Dirty Paper Coding Scheme for the MGBC-CM
The achievable strategy in Theorem 3 introduces a double-binning coding scheme
that enables both joint encoding at the transmitter by using Slepian-Wolf bin-
ning [15] and preserving confidentiality by using random binning. However, when
the rate region (20) is used as a constructive technique, it not clear how to choose
the auxiliary random variables V1 and V2 to implement the double binning code-
book, and hence, one has to “guess” the density of p(v1, v2,x). Here, we employ
the DPC strategy to study the achievable secrecy rate region.
For the MGBC-CM, we focus on the new coordinate channel model (9) and
let
x = s1r1 + s2r2. (21)
Hence, the vector s can be viewed as a precoded signal for x. We generate signal
s by dirty paper encoding with Gaussian codebooks [16, 17] as follows.
First, sperate the precoded signal s into two vectors so that
u1 =
[
u1,1
u1,2
]
, u2 =
[
u2,1
u2,2
]
and u1 + u2 = s. (22)
Let U1 and U2 denote random variables corresponding to u1 and u2, respectively.
We choose U1 and U2 as well as auxiliary random variables V1 and V2 as follows:
U1 ∼ CN (0,KU1),
U2 ∼ CN (0,KU2), independent of U1
V1 = U1 and V2 = U2 + bg˜
HU1 (23)
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where KU1 and KU2 are covariance matrices of U1 and U2, respectively, and
b = KU2 g˜(1 + g˜
HKU2 g˜)
−1. (24)
Based on the conditions (23) and Theorem 3, we obtain a DPC rate region for
the MGBC-CM as follows.
Theorem 4. [DPC region] LetR[DPC]I (KU1 ,KU2) denote the union of all (R1, R2)
satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ log2
1 + h˜H(KU1 +KU2)h˜
1 + h˜HKU2h˜
− log2
1 + g˜H(KU1 +KU2)g˜
1 + g˜HKU2 g˜
(25)
and
0 ≤ R2 ≤ log2
1 + g˜HKU2 g˜
1 + h˜HKU2h˜
. (26)
Then, any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ co
 ⋃
tr(KU1+KU2 )≤A
RI(KU1 ,KU2)
 (27)
is achievable for the multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential
messages.
Proof. See the Appendix.
Remark 5. In general, the set of achievable secrecy rates may be increased by
considering another new coordinate channel with the bases
r′1 =
g
|g| and r
′
2 =
|g|h− α∗|h|g√
1− |α|2|h||g| (28)
and reversing the roles of user 1 and user 2.
4.3 Simplified Dirty Paper Coding Scheme
The DPC secrecy rate region (27) requires optimization of the covariance ma-
trices KU1 and KU2 . Here, we consider a simplified DPC scheme as follows. Let
Ai,j = E[|Ui,j |2], for i = 1, 2 and j = 1, 2 (29)
where Ui,j denotes the random variable corresponding to ui,j . The channel input
power constraint implies that
A1,1 +A1,2 +A2,1 + A2,2 ≤ A. (30)
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In particular, we choose the normalized correlation coefficients as
ρ1 ,
E[U1,1U
∗
1,2]√
A1,1A1,2
= −α
∗
|α| and ρ2 ,
E[U2,1U
∗
2,2]√
A2,1A2,2
=
α∗
|α| . (31)
Now, we describe a simplified DPC secrecy rate region based on the setting
(29)-(31). Let
f1(A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2) =
[1 + |h˜|2(A1,1 +A2,1)]f2(A2,1, A2,2)
1 + |g˜|2
[√
βA1,1 −
√
(1− β)A1,2
]2
+ |g˜|2
[√
βA2,1 +
√
(1− β)A2,2
]2 (32)
and
f2(A2,1, A2,2) =
1 + |g˜|2
[√
βA2,1 +
√
(1 − β)A2,2
]2
1 + |h˜|A2,1
(33)
where β = |α|2.
Lemma 1. [simplified DPC region] Let R[S−DPC]I (A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2) denote
the union of all (R1, R2) satisfying
0 ≤ R1 ≤ log2 f1(A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2) (34)
and
0 ≤ R2 ≤ log2 f2(A2,1, A2,2). (35)
Then, any rate pair
(R1, R2) ∈ co
 ⋃
A1,1+A1,2+A2,1+A2,2≤A
RI(A1,1, A1,2, A2,1, A2,2)
 (36)
is achievable for the multi-antenna Gaussian broadcast channel with confidential
messages.
Remark 6. To calculate the simplified DPC secrecy rate region, we need only to
allocate the total power into the precoded signals u1,1, u1,2, u2,1 and u2,2. This
significantly reduces the computational complexity.
4.4 A Special Case
A special case of the MGBC-CM model is the Gaussian MISO wiretap chan-
nel, where the transmitter sends confidential information to only one user (e.g.,
user 2) and treats another user (e.g., user 1) as an eavesdropper. In this case, we
set KU1 = 0, so that KS1,S2 = KU2 . Now, applying Theorems 2 and 4, we obtain
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the following upper and lower bounds on the secrecy capacity of the Gaussian
MISO wiretap channel:
CMISO ≤ min
0≤|ν|≤1
max
tr(KS1,S2)≤A
log2
KeY1,eY2
(1− |ν|2)(1 + h˜HKS1,S2h˜)
(37)
and
CMISO ≥ max
tr(KS1,S2)≤A
log2(1 + g˜
HKS1,S2 g˜)(1 + h˜
HKS1,S2h˜)
−1. (38)
It can been verified that the two bounds meet to describe the secrecy capacity
of the MISO wiretap channel, which is consistent with the result in [18]. In
other words, the corner points of the Sato-type outer bound (17) and the DPC
achievable rate region (27) are identical.
5 Numerical Examples
In this section, we study two numerical examples to illustrates the secrecy rate
region of the MGBC-CM. For simplicity, we assume that the GBC has real input
and output alphabets and α is real too. Under this setting, all calculated secrecy
rate values are divided by 2.
In the first example, we consider the following GBC with a large α,
y1 = s1 + z˜1
y2 = 2(0.9s1 +
√
1− 0.81s2) + z˜2 (39)
i.e., |h˜| = 1, |g˜| = 2 and α = 0.9. The total power constraint is set to A = 10.
Fig. 2 depicts inner and outer bounds on the secrecy capacity for the example
MGBC-CM described in (39). We compare the Sato-type outer bound (indicated
by the dashed line) with the secrecy rate regions achieved by the simplified
DPC coding scheme (indicated by the solid line) and the time-sharing scheme
(indicated by the dash-dot line). Surprisingly, we observe that not only the corner
points but also the boundary of the simplified DPC secrecy rate region (36) is
identical with the Sato-type outer bound (17). Furthermore, Fig. 2 demonstrates
that the time-sharing scheme is strictly suboptimal for providing the secrecy
capacity region.
In the second example, we consider a broadcast channel with a small α
y1 = s1 + z˜1
y2 = 2(0.2s1 +
√
1− 0.04s2) + z˜2 (40)
i.e., |h˜| = 1, |g˜| = 2 and α = 0.2. The total power A = 10. Fig. 3 illustrates that,
again, the boundary of the simplified DPC secrecy rate region (36) is consistent
with the Sato-type outer bound (17).
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Fig. 2. Comparison of the Sato-type outer bound and secrecy rate regions achieved by
time-sharing and simplified DPC schemes for the example MGBC-CM in (39)
6 Conclusion
In this paper, we have investigated outer and inner bounds on the secrecy capac-
ity region of a generally non-degraded Gaussian broadcast channel with confiden-
tial messages for two users, where the transmitter has t antennas and each user
has one antenna. For this model, we have introduced a computable Sato-type
outer bound and proposed a dirty-paper secure coding scheme. Using numerical
examples, we have illustrated that the boundary of the simplified DPC secrecy
rate region is consistent with the Sato-type outer bound.
Based on this observation, we conjecture that the dirty-paper secure coding
strategy achieves the secrecy capacity region of the MGBC-CM.
Appendix
Proof. (Theorem 1) Here we prove Theorem 1 and derive the outer bound for
R1. The outer bound for R2 follows by symmetry.
The secrecy requirement (5) implies that
nR1 = H(W1) ≤ H(W1|Y n2 ,W2) + nǫ. (41)
On the other hand, Fano’s inequality and Pe ≤ ǫ imply that
H(W1|Y n1 ) ≤ ǫ log(M1 − 1) + h(ǫ) , nδ1. (42)
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Fig. 3. Comparison of the Sato-type outer bound and secrecy rate regions achieved by
time-sharing and simplified DPC schemes for the example MGBC-CM in (40)
where h(x) is the binary entropy function. Now, we can bound (41) as follows
nR1 ≤ H(W1|Y n2 ) + nǫ (43)
≤ H(W1|Y n2 )−H(W1|Y n1 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ) (44)
≤ H(W1|Y n2 )−H(W1|Y n1 , Y n2 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ) (45)
= I(W1;Y
n
1 |Y n2 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ) (46)
≤ I(Xn;Y n1 |Y n2 ) + n(δ1 + ǫ) (47)
≤
n∑
i=1
I(Xi;Y1,i|Y2,i) + n(δ1 + ǫ). (48)
Note that the decoding error probability and the equivocation rate at each
user depend only on the marginal probability densities P (y1|x) and P (y2|x).
Hence, one can replace Y1 and Y2 by Y˜1 and Y˜2. Therefore, we have the desired
result.
Proof. (Theorem 4) We first check the power constraint. Since U1 and U2 are
independent and
s = [s1, s2]
⊤ = u1 + u2,
the covariance matrices KU1 and KU2 satisfy
tr(KU1 +KU2) = tr(KS1,S2) ≤ A. (49)
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Following from [19, Theorem 1] and using the setting in (23), we can imme-
diately obtain the well-known successive encoding result:
I(V1;Y1) = log2
1 + h˜H(KU1 +KU2)h˜
1 + h˜HKU2h˜
(50)
and
I(V2;Y2)− I(V1;V2) = log2(1 + g˜HKU2 g˜). (51)
Since V1 = U1 is independent of U2 and V2 = U2 + bg˜
HU1, we have
I(V2;Y1|V1) = I(U2 + bg˜HU1; Y1|U1)
= I(U2;Y1|U1) (52)
= log2(1 + h˜
HKU2h˜). (53)
Moreover, we note that
I(V1;Y2|V2) + I(V1;V2) = I(V1, V2;Y2)− [I(V2;Y2)− I(V1;V2)]
= log2
1 + g˜H(KU1 +KU2)g˜
1 + g˜HKU2 g˜
. (54)
Substituting (50)-(54) into (18) and (19), we have the desired result.
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